AJ Surveyors, WISE consultants, sue East Coast Road over RM12.15 million in unpaid fees for West Ipoh Span Expressway project

A high-stakes dispute surrounding the West Ipoh Span Expressway (WISE) project has intensified as a land surveying firm sues the concessionaire for overdue payments, threatening to complicate a RM6.2 billion infrastructure program designed to relieve congestion around the Menora Tunnel and accelerate Perak’s highway network. The case highlights the broader financing, pre-construction, and contractual challenges that typically accompany large-scale expressways in Malaysia, where project execution depends on a delicate balance of funding commitments, land acquisitions, engineering milestones, and timely settlements with service providers. With the concession agreement (CA) signed on September 5, 2024, and a 55-year concession horizon, stakeholders are closely watching how the ensuing legal and financial frictions will affect the project timeline, construction progress, and operational milestones slated for completion in 2028. The following sections unpack the complex narrative, tracing the threads of payments, CPs, land surveying, corporate ownership structures, and the financing architecture that underpin East Coast Road Sdn Bhd’s bid to deliver WISE.

Table of Contents

Background and scope of the West Ipoh Span Expressway (WISE) project

The West Ipoh Span Expressway (WISE) is a flagship expressway project in Perak designed to span 60.88 kilometers, connecting Gopeng to Kuala Kangsar. The undertaking is framed as a strategic transport corridor aimed at alleviating pressure on the Menora Tunnel—an important segment of the North-South Expressway—by offering an alternative route that can absorb a portion of the existing traffic flow and reduce congestion along one of the state’s busiest metropolitan gateways. The project’s estimated cost sits at RM6.2 billion, underscoring its significance as a long-duration, capital-intensive infrastructure play that relies on a 55-year concession model to deliver public-private partnership objectives. The expected completion date is 2028, a timetable that places urgent emphasis on securing financing, aligning procurement and design activities, and ensuring that land acquisition processes and surveys meet the stringent conditions precedent that underpin the CA and its associated financing instruments.

In this context, East Coast Road Sdn Bhd (ECR) was awarded a 55-year concession to develop and operate the expressway, signaling a transfer of risk and reward from government authorities to the private sector for the life of the concession. The project optics emphasize both economic and social benefits: easing travel times for residents and businesses, stimulating regional development along the corridor, and unlocking potential land value by enabling more efficient transport links. However, as with many large-scale road projects, progress hinges on a series of interdependent steps—from securing funding and achieving financial close to obtaining land rights and finalizing design work—each of which can trigger or complicate subsequent milestones. The WISE project’s governance, funding strategy, and contracting framework thus sit at the intersection of engineering excellence, financial engineering, and legal compliance, setting the stage for a protracted process in which any disruption to payments, CPs, or surveys can reverberate across the project’s critical path.

From regulatory standpoints, the project engages multiple public sector touchpoints, including the Public Private Partnership Unit (UKAS) and the Ministry of Works, whose oversight ensures alignment with national infrastructure objectives and procurement guidelines. The interplay of government approvals, concession terms, toll mechanics, and performance obligations further elevates the importance of predictable cash flows and timely execution. As the project negotiates the early-stage demands of financial close and pre-construction readiness, all eyes remain on the ability of ECR to assemble the equity and debt package required to move from planning to construction and, eventually, operation. The following sections detail the tensions and developments that have arisen in this high-profile project, focusing on the payment disputes, CPs, land surveying, and the broader implications for project readiness and risk management.

Tender, concession award, and the catch-up period: timeline and milestones

The awarding of the 55-year concession to East Coast Road Sdn Bhd (ECR) marks a pivotal milestone for the WISE project, signaling the government’s confidence in a private-sector delivery model for a transformative expressway corridor. While the concession award in September 2024 validated a strong project case, it also set in motion a demanding sequence of conditions precedent and financial commitments designed to ensure that readiness for construction is achieved in a timely fashion. The CA established the governance framework under which ECR would mobilize resources, secure financing, and commence land acquisitions, engineering design, and construction work in accordance with agreed milestones and performance standards.

In the months following the CA award, the project has confronted several interlinked challenges that threaten to delay certain activities or tighten the schedule for achieving critical milestones. Foremost among these is the dispute with AJ Surveyors (M) Sdn Bhd, the land surveyor engaged to conduct essential surveying, land acquisition, and final surveying works for the expressway. AJ Surveyors has claimed RM12.15 million in outstanding payments, triggering a formal dispute that could impede the provision of required surveying reports to the relevant land administration authorities. This development has direct implications for the land acquisition process, which in turn affects the ability to clear the way for construction and to meet the UKAS- and CP-related obligations that depend on timely land rights documentation and survey verifications.

The payment dispute is set against a broader backdrop of expected financial close processes, including a potential increase in paid-up capital and the structuring of equity and debt to meet the project’s funding needs. The expectation, as reflected in internal discussions cited by press sources, is that East Coast Road would need to demonstrate robust financial strength at the next quarterly UKAS meeting—scheduled for March 5—to show that the project can progress through construction and land acquisition phases. This involves not only confirming that the project has secured adequate equity, but also that it has entered into binding agreements with lenders and that partial or full debt facilities have been arranged to support pre-construction costs and eventual construction financing.

Notably, the UKAS engagement is not simply a financial formality; it serves as a critical checkpoint to validate the construction readiness, including the progress of land acquisitions and the technical readiness of design and engineering packages. The interplay between the land surveying reports, the land acquisition timeline, and the project’s financial close demonstrates how fragile the early-stage sequencing can be for a project of this scale. If key providers like AJ Surveyors are unable to complete or certify surveying outputs due to payment disputes, the land acquisition pipeline can stall, which in turn jeopardizes the timely realization of CPs and the ability to move forward with construction financing and equity deployment.

In summarizing the timeline, the WISE project’s progress depends on a synchronized chain of events: (1) secure and certify financial close, (2) confirm land acquisition readiness and land rights documentation, (3) finalize detailed engineering design and related consultations, (4) establish primary debt and equity packages, and (5) commence actual construction. Each step is sensitive to external risks ranging from contractual disputes with service providers to the ability to satisfy CPs, and even to macro-financial conditions that influence the availability and cost of financing. The subsequent sections will dive deeper into the financial architecture, the specific claims involved in the AJ Surveyors case, and what these developments mean for the project’s roadmap and risk posture.

Financing architecture and the financial close: funding, equity, and debt plans

Securing robust, well-structured financing is essential to translating the WISE project’s ambitious scope into a physically deliverable road network. The project’s financial architecture rests on a combination of equity contributions from the concessionaire and debt financing secured from financial institutions, all designed to support the RM6.2 billion development cost and meet pre-construction requirements, such as land acquisition, design engineering, and surveying. The publicly stated expectation is that East Coast Road would ultimately assemble equity substantial enough to cover a significant portion of the development cost, complemented by a debt package intended to mobilize the balance. Based on industry norms and the project’s scale, a typical rule-of-thumb for pre-development equity might hover around 20% of total project costs, which would translate to roughly RM1.24 billion for a RM6.2 billion project. This equity portion is intended to pay for land acquisitions and other pre-development costs, including land surveying and design engineering services.

In the context of WISE, the equity component is critical not merely for capital structure but also for sending a credible signal to lenders that the sponsor has skin in the game and that the project’s governance and risk management strategies are sound. The financing plan is reported to contemplate a mix of term financing and debt facilities, with a RM1 billion line of term financing reportedly lined up from a financial institution to support the equity portion and to shore up liquidity for pre-construction activities. Moreover, there is mention of arranging RM6 billion in Islamic financing instruments, including an Islamic MTN (medium-term note) and a syndicated Islamic term bridge facility. This structure would provide a protracted but flexible debt profile consistent with the project’s long horizon and the Shariah-compliant financing preferences that investors may favor for infrastructure assets in Malaysia.

Key roles in arranging the financing appear to be filled by principal advisers and lead arrangers who would coordinate the debt package, negotiate terms with lenders, and ensure compliance with the CA’s conditions. The anticipated schedule for achieving financial close is tied to the broader procurement and construction launch timetable, and any delays in securing or finalizing debt arrangements could impact the overall project schedule. In addition, the government and UKAS involvement continues to shape the financial close process by requiring evidence of capital adequacy and financial capability to undertake the project. The implication for project governance is clear: a robust, transparent, and enforceable financing plan is essential to minimize liquidity risk, support timely payments for service providers such as AJ Surveyors, and maintain momentum toward construction milestones.

From a macro perspective, the financing architecture reflects the typical pattern for large Malaysian expressways: a blend of equity contributed by the concessionaire’s stakeholders, supplemented by bank and non-bank lenders offering structured debt facilities, and sometimes conventional or Islamic financing instruments designed to optimize the project’s tax and regulatory position. The integration of Islamic debt facilities adds another layer of governance, requiring compliance with Shariah principles and consistent reporting to investors and regulators. The plan’s viability also hinges on achieving financial close within a timeframe that aligns with UKAS’s quarterly review cycles and the CPs outlined in the CA. In light of the AJ Surveyors dispute and the need to resolve outstanding payments, lenders and equity partners may seek additional assurances or collateral to protect their positions, while the concessionaire’s management must balance cash flow needs against any settlement terms that might emerge from the dispute.

In sum, the financing blueprint for WISE embodies a classic infrastructure finance orchestration: secure equity, structure debt with suitable tenors and conditions, align with CPs, and sustain liquidity for early-stage development costs. The next phase will likely emphasize demonstrated funding readiness, confirmed land rights and surveying outputs, and a comprehensive mitigation plan for any ongoing disputes affecting project cash flows. Stakeholders will be watching not only the headline financial close number but also the quality and timeliness of the underlying commitments—from land surveys to conveyancing and engineering performance—that collectively enable the project to advance toward construction.

The AJ Surveyors dispute: claims, payments, and implications for CPs

AJ Surveyors (M) Sdn Bhd has filed a legal challenge against East Coast Road over unpaid invoices related to land surveying and related services performed for the WISE project. The dispute centers on a claim of RM12.15 million in outstanding payments tied to land surveying, land acquisition, and final surveying works—essential components in establishing land rights and regulatory clearance for the expressway. The contract between AJ Surveyors and East Coast Road was established to provide critical surveying outputs necessary to progress through the land acquisition phase and to satisfy CA-related requirements. The contract sum for services rendered was RM18.87 million, with payment terms detailing settlement within 30 days from the date of invoice and completion certificates for each job. AJ Surveyors was appointed as the consultant for the project on November 8, 2021, and the dispute escalated to a formal legal action by June 24, 2024, after unresolved settlement discussions.

The timeline reveals a pattern consistent with complex infrastructure projects where multi-year engagement with service providers intersects with ongoing financing considerations. After legal action was initiated in 2024, there were months of court proceedings, culminating in a settlement offer proposed by AJ Surveyors in November 2024. East Coast Road responded by December 5, 2024 with a rejection of the settlement proposal, indicating that the offer could not be considered at that time. With the rejection, the matter proceeded to trial, signaling a continuation of the dispute that could potentially affect the project’s ability to satisfy CPs and maintain the necessary cadence for survey data, land reports, and subsequent regulatory approvals.

The implications of the dispute extend beyond the immediate payments. In the project’s pre-construction framework, surveying outputs are foundational to land acquisition progress, which in turn unlocks the ability to transfer land rights to the concessionaire and initiate civil works planning phases. If AJ Surveyors’ reports are delayed or disputed due to the financial disagreement, land reports cannot be finalized and submitted to the relevant authorities, such as the Pejabat Tanah dan Galian (PTG) Perak, delaying the land acquisition process. The delay in land acquisition would slow or halt pre-development activities, potentially jeopardizing CPs that hinge on the timely completion of surveys and the availability of land for development. The UKAS quarterly meeting scheduled for March 5 will assess East Coast Road’s ability to demonstrate the financial strength to undertake the project, and the ongoing AJ Surveyors dispute could color lender and investor confidence, particularly if it signals broader risk-management deficiencies or questions about contract execution and vendor management.

From a legal perspective, the AJ Surveyors claim adds a layer of complexity to East Coast Road’s exposure and risk profile. If trials proceed and the court determines in favor of AJ Surveyors, a financial outflow would reduce the company’s liquidity, potentially affecting the ability to fund initial pre-construction activities and settlements with other service providers. Conversely, if East Coast Road prevails, there could be a legal precedent limiting claims or modifying payment schedules in ways that preserve cash, but at the same time requiring adjustments to working capital planning and vendor management practices. The broader effect on the WISE project includes possible indications to lenders and equity partners about the reliability of contract execution, the transparency of cost reporting, and the project’s capacity to enforce terms in the presence of disputes. In a sector where projects hinge on precise deliverables and strict adherence to schedules, such disputes can influence the timing of land acquisitions, ultimately affecting the project’s ability to meet its construction timetable and its overall risk profile.

The AJ Surveyors dispute also invites scrutiny of the ownership structure and intercompany relationships that accompany the WISE project. The relationship between East Coast Road and related entities— including Zurich Infrastructure Sdn Bhd and Mohd Asbi Associates Sdn Bhd, which have their own contractual and financial footprints—suggests that disputes in one part of the ecosystem can have cascading effects on the broader project. In this environment, a settlement or resolution of AJ Surveyors’ claims could relieve some pressure on cash flows and contract administration, while a protracted dispute could amplify concerns about liquidity, the readiness of the land acquisition process, and the project’s ability to satisfy CPs. As the legal process unfolds, stakeholders will be watching the court’s rulings and any potential settlements to gauge how the dispute might influence the WISE project’s forward momentum, the negotiating posture of lenders, and the willingness of service providers to continue to engage under current terms.

In summary, the AJ Surveyors case raises important questions about payment discipline, contract performance, and the sequencing of land-related activities that underpin WISE’s pre-construction phase. The outcome will be consequential for the timing of land acquisition, the availability of survey outputs for regulatory clearance, and the ability of East Coast Road to firmly anchor its financing and CP compliance. The subsequent sections will examine the land acquisition and surveying process in more depth, as well as the broader corporate ownership and financing implications that frame the project’s risk landscape.

Land acquisition, surveying, and the cascading effects on pre-construction readiness

A core sequence within the WISE program hinges on land acquisition and the timely delivery of surveying outputs that underpin regulatory clearance, project design, and construction planning. The land acquisition process is designed to unlock the parcels of land necessary to build the expressway, with a series of steps that typically involve surveying, verification of land titles, negotiations with landowners, and formal requisition and compensation processes. In WISE, the land surveying work conducted by AJ Surveyors is central to delivering the necessary land reports to the Pejabat Tanah dan Galian (PTG) Perak and validating the land boundaries, topography, and other physical attributes essential to project planning and feasibility analysis. Without these surveys, the process to secure land rights and to schedule construction cannot progress, creating a bottleneck that can ripple through the entire project pipeline.

The reports produced by the land surveyor serve multiple roles. They establish precise boundary definitions and area calculations, support land valuations and compensation calculations, and facilitate the documentation required for regulatory approvals and the transfer of land rights to the concessionaire. In a project of this magnitude, the integrity and timeliness of survey outputs directly influence the ability to finalize land acquisitions, which, in turn, affect the overall project schedule, budget alignment, and risk exposure. In the case of WISE, the inability to start land acquisitions due to unresolved surveys with AJ Surveyors risks delaying critical early works, which are prerequisites for mobilizing construction resources, securing permits, and satisfying CPs tied to the CA.

The legal tension between AJ Surveyors and East Coast Road underscores the broader risk environment facing land acquisition activities. If surveys are delayed or disputed, the PTG Perak and other land administration agencies may not be able to verify land boundaries or confirm title status in a timely manner, leading to potential regulatory hold-ups. This has a direct bearing on the project’s pre-development costs and financing readiness, as lenders and the UKAS unit require evidence of credible progress in land rights documentation and a secure path to procuring land for development. A disruption in the land acquisition sequence also raises questions about the sequencing of other pre-construction activities, such as land surveying for design refinement, topographic modeling, environmental assessments tied to land use, and the coordination of compensation processes with landowners.

From an operational standpoint, the land acquisition pipeline must synchronize with the engineering and design teams to ensure that acquired lands are integrated into construction plans, access rights are established, and environmental and social impact assessments are aligned with regulatory expectations. The failure to initiate or complete land acquisitions could throttle early earthworks, drainage design, and roadbed preparation, thereby delaying critical path activities and the overall project schedule. In such a scenario, project governance would need to implement robust contingency planning, including exploring alternative survey providers, expediting documentation with PTG Perak, and implementing revised land acquisition timelines that minimize disruption to the construction start date.

The broader picture underscores a fundamental truth about large-scale expressway development: land acquisition is as critical as the build itself. The efficiency and reliability of surveying outputs underpin the credibility of the entire pre-construction phase and the subsequent transition into active construction. The WISE project’s ability to progress through this phase will be closely tied to resolving the AJ Surveyors dispute, stabilizing surveying output deliveries, and ensuring that land rights and associated documentation can be produced promptly and verified by the relevant authorities. The next sections will delve into the CP framework, the role of UKAS, and the strategic implications of ownership and corporate structures on the project’s financing and governance.

UKAS, CPs, and the path to financial close: governance and compliance

A project’s ability to move from planning into construction hinges not only on securing capital but also on satisfying a robust set of conditions precedent (CPs) designed to de-risk the investment and ensure readiness for execution. In the WISE program, the UKAS (Public Private Partnership Unit) engagement represents a critical oversight mechanism that evaluates whether East Coast Road Sdn Bhd has the financial strength, governance, and operational readiness to undertake the expressway development and to deliver the expected performance over the concession period. The CPs associated with the CA are the instrumental milestones that gate the transition from planning to construction. They require a combination of financial close, land acquisitions, design readiness, environmental clearances, and other regulatory prerequisites to be achieved within specified timeframes.

One of the central CP-related concerns highlighted in reporting concerns the need for East Coast Road to demonstrate sufficient funding for construction and to verify construction progress, starting with land acquisitions, during a forthcoming quarterly meeting with UKAS in March. The expectation is that the company will present evidence of financial close readiness, including the status of equity funding, debt commitments, and a credible plan for constructing the road while meeting budgetary constraints. The UKAS evaluation, in this context, serves as a capstone verification that illuminates whether the project is sufficiently capitalized to progress to construction and whether the management structure and governance processes are capable of handling the complexities of a long-term PPP concession.

The project’s CP framework also encompasses the requirement to secure and verify the land acquisition process. The land reports and the ability to initiate land acquisitions are contingent on the resolution of the ongoing dispute with AJ Surveyors, as discussed previously. If land acquisition cannot begin or cannot be verified due to delays or disputes in surveying, it risks triggering a CP breach, thereby entailing potential penalties or renegotiations of the project’s terms. In this sense, the CPs function as a systemic mechanism to ensure readiness and to reward timely performance, while also providing a structured pathway for addressing issues that could derail construction or create long-tail risk exposures for lenders and equity partners.

From a governance perspective, meeting CPs requires a coordinated effort among multiple entities within the project ecosystem, including East Coast Road, its lenders, Abu Dhabi-based or other equity partners (depending on the final capital structure), and technical consultants such as AJ Surveyors and Mohd Asbi Associates. This coordination extends to ensuring that the land reports are delivered to PTG Perak, that the design and engineering milestones meet technical standards, and that all regulatory approvals are in place to begin construction activities. The UKAS review adds an additional layer of assurance to the financing community, signaling that the project is not only financially viable but also operationally capable of delivering the promised outcomes within the planned schedule.

Additionally, the CP framework implies that any delays or disputes that interfere with the land acquisition process or with the timely delivery of surveying outputs could jeopardize the project’s ability to achieve financial close on schedule. Consequently, lenders and equity participants will be keen on risk mitigation strategies that address potential disruptions in surveying, land rights verification, and other critical pre-construction activities. The project’s governance structure and due diligence processes, public reporting norms, and the clarity of contracting arrangements with service providers will all contribute to the perceived risk profile and, by extension, the cost and availability of capital.

In summary, UKAS oversight and the CP framework play indispensable roles in shaping the WISE project’s path to financial close. The March meeting will be a focal point for assessing whether the project has the requisite funding, governance, and readiness to progress into construction. The resolution of outstanding payment disputes, land acquisition readiness, and the ability to demonstrate credible progress on surveying and design will all influence the likelihood of achieving financial close on the projected timetable. The watchword for stakeholders is disciplined execution, transparent reporting, and proactive risk management to minimize disruptions that could threaten the project’s commercial viability and public value.

Ownership, corporate structure, and the web of related entities

The WISE project’s corporate and ownership architecture features several intertwined entities, each bearing distinct roles and stakes that collectively shape the project’s risk profile, governance dynamics, and financing arrangements. East Coast Road Sdn Bhd (ECR) is the concessionaire entrusted with developing and operating the 60.88-kilometer expressway between Gopeng and Kuala Kangsar in Perak, under the terms of a 55-year concession. ECR is at the center of the project’s financing, contracting, and performance obligations, serving as the vehicle through which equity investments are organized, debt facilities are drawn, and day-to-day project management is conducted. The close links between ECR and other industry participants reflect a broader network of shareholders, related entities, and affiliates that influence decision-making, governance, and cash flow dynamics.

The ownership details highlighted in the coverage point to a layered structure:

East Coast Road’s ownership includes a 52.85% stake held by Any Arope Zainal Abidin and a 10.7% stake held by Ahmad Sahill Zainal Abidin. These figures indicate a family-controlled or founder-linked leadership and stake in the concessionaire, a common pattern in PPP infrastructure ventures where founders or principal promoters maintain controlling positions.
Zurich Infrastructure Sdn Bhd is a stakeholder with significant influence, and its ownership is linked to Zurich Headquarter Sdn Bhd, which itself is majority-owned by Any Arope. Zurich Capital Sdn Bhd is another investor in East Coast Road with a 13.76% stake.
Zurich Zainal Abidin is described as the largest shareholder of Zurich Capital with a 40% equity interest, while the remaining 60% is held by Ahmad Sahill and Zulykha Zainal Abidin, which suggests a cross-holding arrangement that ties the performance of Zurich entities to the WISE project.
Mohd Asbi Associates Sdn Bhd is described as an engineering consultancy involved in the project, with a letter of award (LOA) for design services on the WISE project dated July 19, 2022, and with an outstanding financial claim related to conceptual and preliminary design fees.
SSM (Companies Commission of Malaysia) data indicates East Coast Road’s issued and paid-up capital at RM8.8 million, with non-current assets and current assets reported at RM1.46 million and RM5.5 million respectively as of October 30, 2023. Liabilities were modest at that time (no non-current liabilities and RM434,218 current liabilities). These data points offer a snapshot of ECR’s financial position, though they may have evolved since 2023 amid ongoing project financing and contracting activities.
Additional corporate strands include Zurich Infrastructure Sdn Bhd and related entities, with notable stakeholders such as Datuk Seri Siew Mun Chuang and other family or corporate shareholders with influence over Zurich Infrastructure and Zurich Capital, signaling a network of related interests feeding into the WISE project through equity or contract relationships.
The LOD (letter of demand) issued by Mohd Asbi Associates Sdn Bhd to Zurich Infrastructure Sdn Bhd for RM21.03 million related to work on conceptual and preliminary design underlines the broader pattern of intercompany transactions and service agreements that can influence cash flow and credit considerations for ECR and the project as a whole.

This ownership and corporate multiplication matters for several reasons. First, cross-shareholdings and inter-corporate relationships add a layer of complexity when it comes to corporate governance, risk management, and the alignment of incentives among different stakeholders. Conflicts of interest, governance clarity, and decision-making authority may come under scrutiny as project milestones approach and financing discussions intensify. Second, the distribution of ownership matters to lenders and investors concerned about the durability of equity commitments, potential dividend flows, and the ability to unwind positions in the event of disputes or restructuring. Third, the relationships among the various Zurich entities, Any Arope, Ahmad Sahill Zainal Abidin, and other shareholders influence the strategic direction and priority setting for WISE, including the management of service providers like AJ Surveyors and Mohd Asbi Associates.

Finally, the equity structure and the associated claims against the project’s ancillary engineering and surveying providers are tied to ongoing litigation and dispute resolution processes. While the AJ Surveyors case concerns payments for surveying services, other LODs and disputes—such as the RM21.03 million demand from Mohd Asbi Associates—illustrate that the project’s financial health is sensitive to the performance and payment practices of multiple contractors and consultants. The net effect is an environment where prudent risk management, transparent reporting, and robust credit facilities become essential to maintain momentum and protect the project’s value proposition to public and private stakeholders alike.

In sum, the WISE project’s ownership structure reveals a network of intertwined entities that collectively shape governance, risk, and financing dynamics. The leadership of Any Arope Zainal Abidin and Ahmad Sahill Zainal Abidin appears to anchor significant equity positions, while Zurich Infrastructure and related holdings create cross-holdings and interdependencies that could influence the project’s ability to secure capital, settle disputes, and sustain timely execution. The evolving disputes surrounding surveying and engineering fees underscore the stress points within this corporate web and highlight the importance of disciplined contract management and clear governance mechanisms to minimize the potential for conflicts that could slow or derail the expressway project.

Financing plans revisit: equity requirements, capital structure, and lender confidence

As the WISE project navigates its pre-construction phase, attention returns to the project’s capital structure and the lender’s confidence in the pathway to financial close. The financing plan contemplates an equity portion that is substantial enough to meet a typical eligibility criterion for large-scale infrastructure projects—often around 20% of the total cost—and to support pre-development costs including land acquisitions, surveying, design engineering, and related consultant services. The RM6.2 billion development cost implies an equity requirement of approximately RM1.24 billion if the 20% rule of thumb holds, though final figures could vary depending on the final debt pack, the mix of instruments, and the negotiated terms of the CA.

Within this framework, East Coast Road is reported to have lined up RM1 billion in term financing to bolster its equity, a move that would help bridge the funding gap and provide working capital for pre-construction activities. The plan also includes the appointment of two financial institutions as principal advisers and lead arrangers for a RM6 billion Islamic medium-term notes (MTN) facility and a syndicated Islamic term bridge facility. The combination of debt and Islamic instruments offers a diversified and potentially more cost-efficient financing mix, catering to investor preferences for long-dated, stable cash-flow assets while aligning with Shariah-compliant structures.

However, the ability to secure financial close depends on several preconditions, including:

Demonstrable paid-up capital increases to meet the required level (with reports suggesting a target of RM85 million paid-up capital by the next UKAS meeting). This would imply a more robust equity base and improved capacity to fund early-stage activities without relying solely on debt.
The confirmation that the project has secured the necessary equity commitments and debt facilities to cover pre-development expenditures, including land acquisition, surveying, and design work. The lenders will want to see evidence that the project’s cash flow profile and debt service coverage can sustain the expected payout obligations while preserving liquidity for contingencies.
A credible plan for meeting CPs within the CA’s stipulated timeframe. The CPs are a gating mechanism that signals readiness for construction and the ability to sustain schedule risk in the project’s execution.
Satisfactory progress on land acquisition and surveying milestones, including the timely submission of land reports to PTG Perak and the absence of critical delays that could impede construction scheduling and permit issuance.
Clarity and stability of the project’s governance arrangements and the alignment of incentives among the multiple shareholders and related entities involved. The relationships among East Coast Road, Zurich Infrastructure, Any Arope, Ahmad Sahill Zainal Abidin, and related parties must support coherent decision-making and risk management.

A broader financial-rate environment and credit appetite for large PPP infrastructure assets will also influence the feasibility of achieving an optimal financing package. Given the complexity and scale of WISE, lenders may demand greater resilience against counterparty risk, including the ability of service providers such as AJ Surveyors and Mohd Asbi Associates to deliver on time and within budget. Any residual disputes concerning payment or contract performance could complicate funding negotiations, push up pricing, or lengthen the time to financial close, thereby affecting the project’s schedule and return profile.

Beyond the immediate financing mechanics, the project’s long-run economics depend on the toll structure, traffic forecasts, and the expected public benefits from the expressway. The concession includes a toll rate of 23 sen per kilometer, a pricing arrangement that must be evaluated in light of projected traffic volumes, alternative routes, and socio-economic impacts. The government’s decision to grant the concession and its commitment to the project’s affordability and accessibility will also influence investor sentiment and risk appetite. The December 19, 2024 Minister of Works remarks—that the concessionaire must meet all CPs within 12 months of the CA signing—set a strict but critical deadline for achieving financial close and project readiness, underscoring the urgency for a comprehensive and transparent capital plan that can withstand potential shocks or delays.

In essence, the financing narrative for WISE centers on delivering a credible capital structure with a solid equity base capable of underpinning a layered debt package, while maintaining flexibility to address disputes and regulatory hurdles that accompany such a sophisticated project. The upcoming UKAS meeting will be a decisive inflection point, providing a clearer view of whether the project’s financial architecture is strong enough to proceed into the construction phase. The next sections will examine the broader risk landscape, including the potential implications for construction timelines, stakeholder communications, and regulatory oversight, as well as the environmental and social considerations that often accompany large road-building programs.

Implications of the AJ Surveyors dispute for project timelines and risk

The lawsuit brought by AJ Surveyors against East Coast Road for RM12.15 million in unpaid fees introduces a material risk to the WISE project’s schedule and financial stability. The dispute is not merely a financial disagreement over invoices; it directly implicates the land surveying outputs, the land acquisition timeline, and the capacity to deliver critical pre-construction tasks on the expected cadence. The curtailment of surveying activity due to payment disputes can delay the preparation of land reports that are essential for PTG Perak approvals and for finalizing land rights transfers to the concessionaire. In a project where land acquisition is a precondition for surface works and the initiation of civil works, even temporarily stalled surveying can cascade into delays that ripple through to other pre-construction milestones such as design finalization, utility relocation planning, and environmental compliance reviews.

The timing of this dispute also has implications for UKAS and CP compliance. If land acquisition and surveying are delayed, the UKAS review process may be impeded or complicated, raising questions about the project’s readiness and the ability to demonstrate the necessary financial strength and procurement discipline to proceed. Lenders and equity partners will scrutinize how promptly the dispute is resolved or what mitigations are in place to keep pre-construction activities on track. The outcome of the case will influence the project’s cash flow management, the likelihood of timely settlement of fees owed to service providers, and the governance framework used to monitor and manage vendor relationships. A favorable resolution for AJ Surveyors would improve the liquidity position and accelerate the provision of survey outputs, while a prolonged dispute could necessitate renegotiations of contract terms, alternative surveying arrangements, or concessions that may carry downstream costs and schedule impacts.

From a resilience perspective, the AJ Surveyors dispute amplifies the importance of robust vendor risk management and contingency planning in large PPPs. The project must anticipate potential disputes with other service providers and have a mechanism to isolate and resolve issues without jeopardizing core project milestones. This could involve setting aside reserve funds for dispute resolution, securing partial payments while maintaining performance obligations, or establishing alternative surveying arrangements to ensure continuity of service. The governance framework may need to incorporate enhanced controls, milestones, and escalation protocols to prevent a single vendor dispute from derailing critical-path activities.

The dispute also brings into focus the broader corporate ecosystem in which WISE operates. With intertwined ownership structures and cross-entities, the financial health and contractual compliance of one party can influence others. A resolution that preserves cash flow integrity while upholding the terms of service agreements would be favorable for all stakeholders, whereas a protracted stalemate could prompt lenders to reassess risk exposure and potentially adjust financing covenants or reserve requirements. The outcome could shape subsequent negotiations with other service providers and set a precedent for how the project will manage disputes in the future.

In the end, the AJ Surveyors dispute embodies a pivotal risk vector for WISE, reflecting the sensitivities of pre-construction readiness to the timely provisioning of surveying data, land rights, and associated regulatory completions. The case highlights the need for clear contractual governance, rigorous cost control, and proactive risk management to maintain project momentum in the face of commercial disagreements. The ongoing developments will be closely watched by stakeholders seeking to understand how this dispute will influence the project’s schedule, cash flow dynamics, and the overall risk profile that investors and lenders must absorb as they evaluate WISE’s long-term viability.

Land acquisition readiness and the financial close nexus

Land acquisition readiness is a foundational prerequisite for the WISE project’s successful transition from planning to construction. The ability to advance with land rights transfers, boundary adjustments, and compensation discussions is integral to unlocking the physical space in which the expressway will be built. In practical terms, land acquisition readiness depends on a combination of survey outputs, title verifications, and regulatory approvals that collectively demonstrate that the land rights are secure enough to proceed with construction planning and civil works. The AJ Surveyors dispute adds a layer of uncertainty to this readiness, as the timely submission of land survey reports to PTG Perak is a key determinant of when land acquisition can proceed.

A parallel thread to land readiness is the process of achieving financial close. Lenders and equity sponsors require not only a credible funding plan and debt commitments but also evidence that the land rights and surveying prerequisites have been established in a manner that minimizes construction risk and potential legal disputes. The interdependence of these elements means that delays in surveying and land acquisition can have knock-on effects on the ability to secure financial close, affecting project cash flow projections, debt service assumptions, and the overall risk premium demanded by financiers.

From a financial strategy standpoint, East Coast Road must demonstrate its capacity to fund the project’s equity and service the anticipated debt obligations, even as land rights documentation is being refined. The March UKAS meeting is therefore not only a governance checkpoint but also a signal of whether the project’s readiness aligns with the financing plan. If the project can show credible progress on land acquisitions and survey outputs, lenders may gain confidence that the risk of regulatory delays is mitigated and that construction can start as planned. Conversely, if land acquisition progress remains stalled or uncertain, the project may face higher risk premia and more conservative term sheets, potentially delaying financial close and construction start.

The reference to elevating paid-up capital to RM85 million also ties directly to land readiness. A stronger equity base signals to financiers that the project is in a robust financial position and better able to absorb pre-development costs, including land-related expenditures and the associated surveying work. This adjustment could improve the debt-to-equity balance and support more favorable financing terms, including longer tenors, better covenants, or more flexible repayment structures that align with WISE’s cash flow profile. As the project advances, the synergy between land acquisition readiness and financial close will likely determine both the pace of construction and the ultimate financial structure that emerges to support the concession’s long-term viability.

In summary, land acquisition readiness is a crucial determinant of WISE’s financial close trajectory. The sequencing of surveying, title verification, compensation planning, and land rights handover interacts with the funding plan and equity readiness, creating a complex but essential set of dependencies that stakeholders must manage carefully. The March UKAS meeting will be a decisive inflection point, offering a comprehensive test of whether the project has achieved sufficient progress on land acquisitions and whether the financial architecture is resilient enough to withstand potential delays in surveying and related activities. The result will influence subsequent actions, including the finalization of equity contributions, the signing of debt facilities, and the implementation of a construction start plan that aligns with the concession’s long-term objectives and the country’s broader infrastructure strategy.

Public communications, stakeholder expectations, and the road ahead

In projects of this scale, transparent and proactive public communications are essential for maintaining stakeholder confidence among residents, local governments, investors, and potential lenders. The WISE program sits within a broader public-interest context that seeks to deliver tangible transport improvements while ensuring that the financing and governance arrangements meet high standards of accountability and value-for-money. As disputes arise in the pre-construction phase—such as the AJ Surveyors case—public communications strategies must carefully balance providing clarity about the project’s status with avoiding speculation that could undermine market confidence or trigger unintended regulatory or financial consequences.

Stakeholders will be keen to understand how the project’s governance framework addresses issues of vendor management, contract compliance, and risk mitigation. Explaining how the project intends to manage payables to service providers, including the mechanisms for dispute resolution, interim payments where appropriate, and the safeguards to prevent escalation of disputes into broader project delays, will be central to sustaining trust. Investors and lenders will also look for evidence that the project’s financial close strategy is robust, that the equity base is being strengthened as needed, and that the debt arrangements align with a sustainable cash flow. Clear communication about the steps being taken to resolve disputes and to advance land acquisition and surveying will be key to maintaining momentum and ensuring that stakeholders remain committed to the project’s timetable.

From a regulatory perspective, communications must reflect ongoing compliance with CPs, the CA’s terms, and UKAS oversight. Transparency about progress, risks, and mitigations—without disclosing sensitive commercial information—helps align expectations and reduces the likelihood of misinterpretations that could affect market sentiment or public perception. Public communications will also need to address environmental and social considerations, including potential impacts on local communities and the broader regional economy. Demonstrating a credible plan to manage adverse effects and to maximize public benefits will be central to the project’s social license to operate, which can influence approvals, financing preferences, and long-term concession performance.

Looking ahead, the WISE program’s roadmap hinges on securing financial close, resolving the AJ Surveyors dispute, and ensuring land acquisition readiness proceeds on schedule. The March UKAS meeting will be a focal point for assessing readiness and for clarifying any outstanding issues that could delay downstream milestones. If the project attains financial close in a timely fashion and demonstrates robust land and surveying readiness, construction is expected to commence as planned, with tolls and traffic improvements delivering benefits to drivers, businesses, and the Perak region. The combined effect of strong governance, credible financing, proactive dispute resolution, and a clear plan for land acquisition will shape the project’s trajectory toward delivering a high-quality roadway that supports regional connectivity and economic development.

Regulatory, cabinet, and policy context: government oversight and approvals

The WISE project’s regulatory and policy environment frames its trajectory, with formal cabinet approvals and government oversight shaping the authorization, funding, and execution of the expressway development. The project received cabinet endorsement in December 2023, which cleared the path for concessional development and the concession award. The government’s role in providing a stable policy and regulatory environment, as well as ensuring that public funds (including guarantees, if any) align with government priorities, remains central to the project’s ongoing success. The December 19, 2024 ministerial statement underscored that the concessionaire must meet all CPs within 12 months of signing the CA, setting a stringent but essential deadline for readiness and for validating the concession’s viability in the government’s infrastructure program.

Regulatory oversight extends beyond the cabinet and UKAS. It includes the Ministry of Works, which is responsible for signing and implementing the concession agreement, enforcing its terms, and coordinating with other relevant public agencies to align the project with national transport planning and road network strategies. The UKAS unit’s involvement is particularly crucial as it acts as a broker between the private concessionaire and the government, evaluating readiness, risk management, and capacity to deliver. Their assessment informs government decision-making on releases of funds, permit approvals, and milestones, ensuring that the project adheres to policy objectives and public accountability standards.

The regulatory environment also intersects with the land administration framework, environmental approvals, and social impact considerations. For land acquisitions, the PTG Perak’s role is to verify land reports and validate legal rights to expropriate or acquire land for public use in accordance with Malaysian law. These steps are indispensable to clearing the way for construction and to ensuring compliance with property rights and compensation regimes. The ongoing land surveying and disputed payments thus sit at the nexus of regulatory compliance and project execution, where delays in meeting CPs or in delivering regulatory metrics can reverberate through the government’s oversight and potentially influence budget allocations or project prioritization across infrastructure programs.

In sum, government oversight and policy context provide both a guardrail and a potential pressure point for WISE. The cabinet’s endorsement and the CA’s terms establish the public-interest framework within which the project must function, while UKAS oversight and CPs function as a mechanism to ensure accountability and readiness. The project’s ability to satisfy these regulatory expectations—especially in light of the AJ Surveyors dispute and land acquisition challenges—will be essential to maintaining momentum, ensuring timely approvals, and preserving public confidence in Malaysia’s commitment to delivering major transport infrastructure on time and within budget.

Risk landscape, mitigation strategies, and the path forward

The WISE project sits in a high-risk, high-reward corridor of infrastructure development where a mosaic of financial, legal, regulatory, and operational risks converge. The AJ Surveyors dispute, land acquisition uncertainties, and the complex corporate ownership structure create multifaceted risk vectors that require deliberate mitigation strategies. The central risk themes include:

Cash flow and liquidity risk: Outstanding payments to service providers, potential litigation costs, and the timing of equity injections can strain liquidity and complicate the ability to fund pre-construction activities.
Regulatory and CP risk: Delays in satisfying CPs, particularly around financial close, land acquisition readiness, and regulatory approvals, could trigger penalties or renegotiations of concession terms.
Construction risk: Any delay in early works, including earthworks and drainage design tied to land rights, can push back the overall project schedule and escalate project costs.
Vendor risk and contract performance: The viability of WISE depends on reliable performance by external consultants and service providers, including AJ Surveyors and Mohd Asbi Associates, and the ability to promptly settle legitimate claims.
Ownership and governance risk: The intertwined ownership structure introduces potential governance challenges, including conflicts of interest, decision-making bottlenecks, and cross-entity risk sharing.

To navigate these risks, a set of mitigation strategies would typically be deployed:

Strengthen working capital management and ensure transparent, timely reporting of all payables, with clear escalation paths for disputes to prevent knock-on effects on critical-path activities.
Implement a robust dispute resolution framework with defined timelines, interim payments, and objective criteria for resolving disputes that affect essential pre-construction milestones.
Establish contingency plans for surveying and land acquisition, including the ability to switch surveying providers, secure alternative sources of data, or accelerate regulatory submissions if primary outputs are delayed.
Enhance governance mechanisms, including independent oversight for vendor relationships, clear segregation of duties, and robust conflict-of-interest policies to ensure decisions are made in the project’s best interest.
Maintain ongoing engagement with UKAS and the Ministry of Works to ensure alignment with CP timelines and to secure early indications of government support or adjustments to schedules if delays arise.
Preserve environmental and social risk management capacity to address potential community concerns and ensure that development remains aligned with public-interest objectives, maintaining a social license to operate.

As the project moves forward, the ability to translate these mitigation strategies into concrete actions will determine whether WISE can meet its milestones, secure the needed capital, and deliver the expressway aligned with the government’s broader infrastructure strategy. Stakeholders will remain attentive to quarterly UKAS updates, court developments regarding AJ Surveyors and Mohd Asbi Associates, and the evolving financial close dynamics as the project seeks to stabilize its pre-construction phase and lock in a path toward construction.

Conclusion

The West Ipoh Span Expressway represents a bold step in Perak’s transport transformation, designed to relieve congestion at a critical bottleneck and unlock economic opportunities across the region. Yet the project’s path to realization is fraught with complex challenges that intersect finance, law, governance, and procurement. The RM6.2 billion facility depends on a tightly choreographed sequence of events, including securing robust financing, achieving financial close, and meeting CPs, all while navigating land acquisition, surveying outputs, and service-provider settlements. The AJ Surveyors dispute underscores the risk embedded in pre-construction activities, where even seemingly routine payments for surveying can have outsized implications for project readiness and cash flow.

The ownership and corporate network that underpins East Coast Road and its affiliates add a layer of strategic complexity that requires vigilant governance, clear communication, and disciplined risk management to avoid misalignment of incentives and to ensure that the project’s risk exposures are well understood and managed. The project’s financing architecture—encompassing equity commitments, debt facilities, and Islamic financing options—reflects a sophisticated approach to mobilizing capital for a long-horizon expressway, but it also makes the project sensitive to early disruptions that could affect the timing of financial close and the sequencing of pre-construction activities.

As WISE progresses, the March UKAS meeting will be particularly telling, offering a concrete signal about whether the project’s readiness and funding plan remain on track. The government’s policy framework and regulatory environment provide a stabilizing backdrop, yet they also impose a high bar for performance and accountability that must be met through rigorous execution and transparent reporting. If the project can demonstrate credible progress on land acquisitions, surveys, and financial readiness, it stands a strong chance of advancing to construction and delivering the anticipated long-term transport and economic benefits for Perak and beyond.

In the near term, resolving the AJ Surveyors dispute, clarifying land acquisition timelines, and securing the planned equity and debt packages will be the critical acts that determine whether WISE can transition from planning to real-world construction. The road ahead will require disciplined governance, strategic risk management, and proactive stakeholder engagement to turn this transformative corridor into a tangible asset that enhances regional connectivity, reduces congestion, and contributes to Malaysia’s broader infrastructure ambitions.